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Preliminary Screening of
Prosecutorial Access to Death
Qualified Juries:
A Missing Constitutional Link
In the midst of them, the hangman,
ever busy and ever worse than useless,
was in constant requisition.
-Charles Dickens'
F. THOMAS SCHORNH'ORST*
INTRODUCTION
A death penalty trial is a unique feature of American criminal justice.
Based upon the ideas expressed in a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions,2
the arbitrary and discriminatory application of capital punishment in the
United States, condemned by the Court a few years earlier, 3 is avoidable
through a combination of substantive and procedural controls designed to
guide and limit the discretion of those who decide whether a person should
die for committing a crime." A salient component of the capital case in
states retaining the option of executing murderers,' which has survived the
Supreme Court's scrutiny, is the use of a "death qualified" jury to decide
the guilt or innocence of the accused. This morbid, but apt, phrase describes
jury selection procedures which allow prosecutors to remove for cause6 jurors
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
1. C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 3 (Oxford 1967) (Ist ed. London 1859).
2. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. For general discussions of the nature and effectiveness of these controls see Zimring &
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Restrospect,
18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 927 (1985); Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at
the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1037 (1985); Hubbard,
"Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on
Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1113 (1985); Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U.
PA. L. REv. 1 (1980).
5. Since the Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional for the crime of rape, Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the thirty-seven states which allow for capital punishment
have restricted its use to the crime of murder. For a listing of the death penalty states and the
death row populations in each, see NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., DEATH
Row, U.S.A., Oct. 1, 1986 [hereinafter DEATH Row].
6. A challenge for cause generally is based upon the prospective juror's inability to act
fairly or impartially. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(c)
(1984). The number of challenges for cause is unlimited. Each side also is given a specific
number of peremptory challenges which may be exercised without specific reason. Id. at §
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who are qualified to sit in criminal trials, but whose personal attitudes toward
capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance
of [their] duties as ... juror[s] in accordance with [their] instructions and
oath." 7
Local prosecutors control the process by which capital cases are initiated
and in most jurisdictions there is no formal check upon a prosecutor's
discretion to charge persons with capital crimes and thereby to gain for the
state the distinct advantages that complement that choice.8 This problem has
come more clearly into focus after the Supreme Court's recent action in
Lockhart v. McCree,9 upholding the practice of death qualifying juries before
the guilt or innocence phase of a capital trial.
I will argue that a person charged with a capital crime is denied a con-
21.3(d). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), forbiding prosecutors to exercise
peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race.
7. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). This most recent formulation of the
standard for the exclusion of opponents of capital punishment from death penalty trial juries
expands the range of prosecutorial challenges beyond that which had been thought permissible
under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon vacated a sentence of death
imposed by a jury from which any person with "conscientious scruples against capital punish-
ment" had been excluded for cause upon the state's motion (including those who "might
hesitate to return a verdict inflicting [death]"). Id. at 512-13. The process allowed the state to
produce "a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." Id. at 521. The Court in
Witherspoon did recognize that a state choosing to retain the death penalty had a legitimate
interest in trying such cases before jurors who were at least willing to consider the imposition
of any punishment authorized by law. Id. at 522 n.21. In the same footnote the Court articulated
what it thought to be the legitimate basis for the exclusion of jurors because of their strong
anti-capital punishment feelings:
[N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant
sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact
excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard
to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or
(2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making
an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
Relegating this language to the status of dicta after finding more congenial dicta in Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980), Justice Rehnquist found the language quoted in the text
accompanying this footnote to contain the proper constitutional standard for the exclusion of
jurors in capital trials. Witt, 469 U.S. at 420, 424. According to Witt, no magic words need
be uttered either by the juror or the questioner on voir dire to lay a foundation for the state's
cause challenge. The trial judge may sustain the challenge when "left with the definite impres-
sion that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law." Id.
at 426. When reviewing claims on appeal asserting the improper exclusion of a scrupled juror,
"deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror." Id. Given the broaden-
ing of the bases upon which prosecutors could challenge death penalty opponents in Witt, those
whose lives were dependent upon the Court's willingness to declare the death qualification pro-
cess unconstitutional were betting against long odds.
8. Not only does a prosecutor get the advantage of a death qualified jury in a capital
case, the threat of a death sentence provides a strong hand for plea negotiations. In cases
involving multiple defendants, the prosecutor can trade a death charge against one of the
accused for testimony against the others. Also, the greater publicity that will surround a death
penalty case is likely to favor the state.
9. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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stitutional right to due process of law when a prosecutor invokes statutory
death penalty procedures without first obtaining, from a neutral fact finder,' 0
a determination of probable cause to believe that (1) the accused has com-
mitted a crime for which the accused can be sentenced to death, and (2)
there is evidence to support a finding of an aggravating circumstance making
the accused eligible" for a death sentence.' 2
The hopes of many of the 1741'1 men and women waiting on the death
rows of America were dashed near the end of the Supreme Court's 1985-
86 term when, writing for the majority, Justice William Rehnquist explained
in McCree why, in consequence of the death qualifying process, they were
not denied their rights to trials before impartial juries representing fair cross
sections of their communities. '4 The Court held that a prosecutor, having
10. The state may choose either a grand jury or a judicial officer for this purpose. See
infra text accompanying notes 171-76.
11. The phrase "death eligible" has become a term of art in the literature to describe those
murderers whose crimes qualify for a death sentence. See, e.g., Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to
Stale Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133, 135 (1986).
12. When McCree was decided I had pending before the Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari which, inter alia, raised this issue. Two weeks after McCree, the Court denied the
petition. Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2245 (1986).
See infra text accompanying notes 86-104 where the details of this case are discussed.
There is a cause to believe that the issue is not foreclosed. The Court will hear this term a case
that raises a challenge to prosecutorial misuse of death qualified juries. In Buchanan v.
Commonwealth, 691 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1985), cert. granted sub. nom., Buchanan v. Kentucky,
106 S. Ct. 2245 (1986), a defendant who was not charged with a capital crime was tried jointly
with a co-defendant against whom the state was seeking the death penalty. Buchanan moved
to sever his case from that of the co-defendant on the ground that he would be prejudiced by
having his non-capital case determined by a death qualified jury. The state court rejected his
arguments which were premised upon a claim that a death qualified jury tended to favor the
prosecution. 691 S.W.2d at 212.
The Supreme Court seems to be concerned about prosecutorial misuse of the death qualified
jury. Buchanan raises the issue more acutely than Rowan since a resolution of the issue in
Buchanan involves no factual inquiry as to whether the state had legitimate grounds to try the
petitioner as a capital defendant.
13. These persons were on death rows when McCree was decided. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. I, May 1, 1986. The number has grown to
1788. DEATH Row, U.S.A, supra note 5, at 1.
Not all death row inmates would have been entitled to relief had the Supreme Court affirmed
the Eighth Circuit in McCree. Those who had pleaded guilty to the predicate offense or those
who had elected to be tried by a judge would not have had their cases affected. Death row
inmates who had not preserved an objection to the death qualification of their trial juries
apparently are barred from raising the claim in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762 n.2. See generally Catz,
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: Need for a Preclusion Doctrine Exception, 18
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1177 (1985).
The number of preserved challenges to the death qualification process in the various states was
significant. If the Court had ruled in favor of the respondents, doubt would have been cast
upon the validity of the states' fact-finding processes. Such a ruling is likely to have been
retroactive. See generally Y. KAmIsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAE., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
49-58 (6th ed. 1986). The prospect of the states having to retry hundreds of cases may well
have been one of the factors that influenced the Court to uphold the death qualification process.
14. 106 S. Ct. at 1765-70.
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charged a person with a capital crime, is entitled to present the issue of that
person's guilt to a jury made up entirely of persons who, before hearing
any evidence of the crime itself, have expressed a willingness to impose (or
at least recommend) a death sentence."
It is not my purpose to critique the Court's rejection of the social science
data that supported the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the practice of death
qualifying capital trial jurors produces a group that is both "conviction
prone" and non-representative of distinctive attitudes held by persons in a
given community. 16 Justice Rehnquist's treatment of the empirical record
that anchored the challenge to the use of death qualified juries in the guilt
or innocence phase of capital trials surely will provoke a veritable paper
wave of response from social scientists, legal scholars and lawyers involved
in death penalty litigation. Judged by the weight of academic sentiment
expressed in anticipation of McCree, '7 the bulk of these responses will not
treat kindly the Court's rejection of the products of so much scholarly
labor. ,8
Significantly, there is in McCree no temporizing about the persuasive effect
of social science research similar to that which appeared eighteen years earlier
in Witherspoon v. Illinois.'9 The Witherspoon Court vacated a sentence of
death imposed by a jury from which all persons with "conscientious scruples"
against capital punishment had, upon the state's motion, been removed for
cause. 20 Such a jury was, in the Court's view, "uncommonly willing to
15. In some jurisdictions the jury is given final sentencing authority, but in others (notably
Florida and Indiana) the jury makes a recommendation to the judge as to whether the accused
should be executed. Elsewhere the jury plays no role in the sentencing process once the accused
is found guilty of a predicate offense. State laws are summarized in Gillers, supra note 4, at
102-19. In states where the jury plays no role in sentencing, death qualification is permitted
to disqualify jurors who may be unable to judge fairly the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For an analysis of the impact of death qualification in a jurisdiction in which the judge has
power to override the jury's recommendation of imprisonment, see Winick, Witherspoon in
Florida: Reflections on the Challenge for Cause of Jurors in Capital Cases in a State in Which
the Judge Makes the Sentencing Decision, 37 U. MIAIn L. REa. 825 (1983). The Supreme
Court has upheld state laws which permit a judge to override a jury's recommendation of
mercy. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
16. The court of appeals was sharply divided on this issue. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom., Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
17. See, e.g., Finch & Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-Qualified Juries: On
Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REy. 21 (1986). The empirical studies relied upon by the
Eighth Circuit are listed in McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-63 nn.4-6. For legal analyses of the
issue see White, Death Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reexamined,
41 U. PrrT. L. REv. 353 (1980); Winick, supra note 15.
18. In his dissenting opinion Justice Marshall pulled no punches in expressing his view of
the majority's treatment of the record generated in the courts below:
With a glib nonchalance ill-suited to the gravity of the issue presented and the
power of the respondent's claims, the Court upholds a practice that allows the
State a special advantage in those prosecutions where the charges are the most serious
and the possible punishments the most severe.
106 S. Ct. at 1771.
19. 391 U.S. 510.
20. Id. at 512.
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condemn a man to die;" '2' it was a "hanging jury" whose decision to impose
the death penalty could not be squared with the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court refused, however, to grant Witherspoon
a new trial on the ground that the same "hanging jury" deprived him of a
fair trial on the issue of his guilt or innocence of the underlying crime of
murder. The data offered in support of this proposition were found to be
"too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the
death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt."
22
This conclusion, however, was based upon "presently available information"23
and the Court implied that if the empirical record demonstrating the bias
of death qualified juries were in the future to be strengthened, there would
be grounds for a per se constitutional rule inhibiting the state's use of such
juries to determine the guilt of the accused. 24
In contrast to the Witherspoon Court's openness to further evidence,
Justice Rehnquist in McCree, after taking a few swings at the methodological
integrity of the empirical studies conducted in the wake of Witherspoon,
25
declared social science to be beside the point:
[W]e will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that "death qualifica-
tion" in fact produces juries somewhat more "conviction prone" than
"non death qualified" juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution
does not prohibit the States from death qualifying juries in capital cases. 26
The state, in other words, is entitled to a "leg up" in a capital trial. To
support this counter-intuitive 27 proposition the Court observed that death
qualification "is carefully designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate
interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply
the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of
a capital trial."'"
21. Id. at 521.
22. Id. at 517.
23. Id. at 518.
24. Id.
25. 106 S. Ct. at 1762-64.
26. Id. at 1764.
27. Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek stand for the proposition that, given the nature of the
penalty, the accused must be given special protections. This idea is captured in the famous
"death is different" language of Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976):
[Tihe penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualita-
tive difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
28. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
29. The Court did not explore whether the process of death qualification was "carefully
designed" to protect the accused's right to a fair determination of his guilt, as well as the
state's interests in the efficiency of a single jury deciding the questions of his guilt and sentence.
The Court did not explore the possibility of alternatives to single juries such as seating extra
19871
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The assumptions underlying this declaration and the reasons given to
justify the Court's endorsement of a process tilted in favor of a state's
interest in convictions are tempting targets for critical analysis. 2 9 For the
purpose of this Article, however, the Court's conclusions are assumed to be
defensible. In any event, it is certain that death qualified juries will remain
a feature of the criminal process and it is important to explore what limi-
tations should be placed upon their use.
The basic premise in McCree is that the prosecution is entitled to a jury
willing to impose any penalty provided by law, and which will not frustrate
or nullify that law because of the personal opposition of some jurors to
capital punishment.3 0 This, however, leads to a negative conclusion. Ac-
cording to the Court's hypothesis, if the state can demonstrate no legitimate
interest in asking for the death penalty in any given case, its use (or threatened
use)3 of a death qualified jury should be foreclosed or, at least, inhibited
through procedural controls.
alternates who could take the places of jurors excludable at the sentencing phase, or of accepting
non-unanimous verdicts at the sentencing phase.
The Court did not make clear who "conceded" the legitimacy of the state's interest in the use
of a single jury. The respondent made no such concession. His argument was to the contrary.
Brief for Respondent at 74-79, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (No. 84-1865).
The Court offers two reasons to support the claim of legitimate state interest in the death
qualification of jurors before trial. First, the state of Arkansas had decided that the same
jurors who decide guilt should decide punishment, and in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153, 158, 160,
163, the Court upheld the right of a state to make that choice. Second, the use of the same
jury in the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial is (if he would only admit it!) an advantage
to a defendant facing a death sentence. "Residual doubts" of jurors hanging over from the
guilt phase of the trial might "bend them to decide against the death penalty." 106 S. Ct. at
1769 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)). This point is examined in Radelet,
Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAvIs L. REv.
1409, 1427-30 (1985).
As to the first reason, it would seem to be appropriate to "balance" the state's interest in
efficiency against the admitted disadvantage to the accused in a trial at which his guilt or
innocence is to be determined. There are a variety of ways in which the state could guarantee
the continuity of the trial and the sentencing jury. Any added expense that would attend the
seating of additional jurors in those few trials in which a death penalty is at issue would not
be significant. See generally Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the
Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1221 (1985).
As to the Court's second point, I would be willing to put the issue of whether the death
qualification of the trial jury is an "advantage" to the accused to a vote of death penalty
defendants and their lawyers, and abide by the results. My guess is they would favor a normally
constituted jury for the first phases of their trials over any purported "residual doubts" of
death qualified jurors in the sentencing phase. The "advantage" disappears if the state permits
the judge to override the sentencing jury's recommendation of mercy. Radelet, supra, at 1427-
30.
30. See 106 S. Ct. at 1766, 1768.
31. The prosecutor's ability to dismiss a death penalty count in exchange for a guilty plea
is a powerful bargaining chip. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The threat of
a death sentence also is an effective recruiter of state witnesses. Id.
[Vol. 62:295
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I. CURRENT STATUS OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL
CHARGING DECISIONS IN CAPITAL CASES
A. State Practices
In the several jurisdictions which have enacted death penalty statutes since
Furman v. Georgia,312 legislative controls upon a prosecutor's discretion to
file death penalty charges reflect a broad range of choice. Indiana, Arkansas
and Washington impose no procedural restraint upon a prosecutor's power
to charge a predicate offense and to request a death penalty. Beyond the
constitutionally mandated ex parte review of the existence of probable cause
for the arrest of the defendant,3 3 there is no prerequisite grand jury or
judicial review of the evidentiary support for either the charge of murder
or the existence of an aggravating circumstance that would support the
imposition of a death sentence. 34 At least in Indiana, there is no prescribed
procedure whereby an accused can challenge the prosecutor's election to try
him as a capital offender. 31
Only eight capital punishment states make formal provision for pretrial
determinations of probable cause as to the existence of at least one of the
aggravating circumstances that will support a death sentence. Within these
states, there are substantive and procedural variations relating to the focus
of the inquiry and the manner in which it is conducted. In Connecticut, 36
32. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
33. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
34. IND. CODE §§ 35-34-1-1(a), (b); 35-33-7-2; 35-33-7-3; 35-33-2-1 (1982 & Supp. 1986);
ARK. CoNsT. amend. XXI; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-409; 43-601 (1977); WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 25; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.37.010 (1980).
35. Absence of probable cause to support a criminal charge is not a basis for dismissing
an information or indictment. IND. CODE § 35-34-1-4(a) (1982). Once an accused is lawfully in
custody by virtue of an arrest warrant premised upon a finding of probable cause to believe
some offense has been committed, the prosecutor is free to file any charge by information
without further judicial screening. Gilliam v. State, 383 N.E.2d 297 (Ind. 1978); State v. Palmer,
496 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. App. 1986).
But see IND. CONST. art. I, § 17: "Offenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or
the presumption strong." This provision provides a means of attacking a murder information
through an application for bail coupled with a claim that the state's proof supporting the
murder charge is not "evident" or "the presumption strong." The burden of establishing such
a claim is upon the defendant. Caudill v. State, 262 Ind. 40, 311 N.E.2d 429 (1974). Because
of the burden of proof, and the absence of an opportunity to attack the validity of an aggravating
circumstance alleged in a death penalty information, the availability of a bail hearing in a
capital case is not adequate procedural protection against a prosecutor's misuse of capital
charges. The bail hearing, however, can be a useful and efficient defense discovery device. The
defendant is entitled to call all of the known prosecution witnesses in his effort to sustain the
burden of proving that the murder charge is not sustainable. A defendant availed himself of
this opportunity in a recent death penalty case. Spranger v. State, 498 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. 1986).
36. CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (West 1985).
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Mississippi, 7 Texas, 38 Utah, 39 and Virginia, 40 aggravating factors which el-
evate murder to a capital offense are included in the statutory definitions
of the crime .4 Any pretrial determination of probable cause to believe the
offense has been committed necessarily will encompass inquiry into the
existence of the facts which would render the accused eligible for a death
sentence. In the remaining three jurisdictions, California, 42 New Hampshire43
and Ohio," aggravating circumstances are incorporated into the sentencing
statute rather than into the definition of the offense, but must be alleged
in the charging indictment or information. 41
Five of the above-mentioned states require prosecution of capital cases by
indictment." The determination of probable cause to proceed with a capital
trial will hence be made by a grand jury. In the other three, the prosecutor
can initiate the process by filing an information, but the case cannot proceed
until a determination of probable cause has been made by a judicial officer
after an adversarial preliminary hearing. 47
In the remaining twenty-six states, a person accused of a capital or non-
capital felony is entitled to a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment
(or a combination of both).48 The screening in death penalty cases in these
states is directed to the predicate offense and does not involve inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence of an aggravating circumstance to support
a death sentence. 49
While grand jury hearings are non-adversarial and uninhibited by rules
37. MIss. CoNsr. art. III, § 27 (1890, amended 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-20 (Supp.
1986).
38. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.141 (Vernon 1977).
39. UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 13 (1895, amended 1948).
40. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-217, 19.2-218 (1983).
41. Washington also incorporates the aggravating circumstances in its definition of the
capital offense, but, as noted in supra text accompanying note 34, it imposes no pretrial
screening between the prosecutor and the accused.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1-190.4 (West Supp. 1986).
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 601:1, 601:6 (1974).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.14 (Page 1982).
45. The legislature's choice to incorporate the aggravating circumstances in the sentencing
statute rather than in the definition of the crime has a significant impact upon the defendant's
right to trial by jury. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Comment, The Death Penalty
Cases: Shaping Substantive Criminal Law, 58 IND. L.J. 187 (1982).
46. Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas and Virginia.
47. California, Connecticut and Utah.
48. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Wyoming. See generally 2 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 6, at 236-76;
C. WlsrrEBr EA & C. SLOoaoN, CaumNi PROCEDURE: AN ANALYsIs OF CASES & CONCEPTs 502-09
(1986).
49. All jurisdictions retaining the death penalty require separate trials on the issues of guilt
and sentencing. The variations in state law are charted in Gillers, supra note 4, at 101-19.
For a discussion of the variations in state death penalty schemes and the powers of judges and
juries with respect to the sentencing decision, see Winick, supra note 15, at 826-31.
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of evidence, 5 preliminary hearings, in states other than Arkansas, Indiana
and Washington, are adversarial. They usually involve the opportunity of
the accused (1) to be represented by counsel, (2) to hear (in some fashion)
the evidence upon which the state seeks to base its charges, (3) to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the state, and (4) to challenge the sufficiency
of evidence upon which the state seeks to force the accused to stand trial
on a particular charge.'
The process in Arkansas, Indiana and Washington, allowing prosecutors
to force a person to stand trial for his or her life merely by filing an
information charging that person with a capital offense, and a perfunctory
showing to a magistrate of probable cause to believe some crime has been
committed, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny in light of McCree.
Before proceeding with an examination of the few occasions on which the
Court has been requested to consider whether due process of law requires
some neutral screening of prosecutorial charging decisions, it will be helpful
to examine data and cases that underscore the need for courts and legislatures
to address the problem in the discrete context of death penalty proceedings.
B. Bases for Independent Pretrial Review of Capital Charges
1. The Chosen Few
In Furman the Supreme Court voided all extant death sentences and state
death penalty statutes. The Court found that even if the death penalty was
not per se a cruel and unusual punishment as measured by "evolving stand-
ards of decency,"152 the administration of the penalty throughout the United
States was so freakish, haphazard, and arbitrary that it was cruel and
certainly unusual. The most damning features of the death penalty processes
identifed in Furman were: (1) the small number of death sentences handed
out in comparison to the number of potentially capital crimes, (2) the lack
of statutory restrictions upon the sentencing discretion of state judges and
juries, and (3) perceived sentencing disparities premised upon the economic
class and race of the offenders. 3
50. See generally 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 6, at 618-44, 668-73; 2 W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, id. at 300-20; Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Pre-
liminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Mici. L. REv. 463 (1980).
51. In some jurisdictions the preliminary hearing is much like a "mini trial" complete with
adherence to rules of evidence and the opportunity of the accused to present affirmative defenses.
In others the rules of evidence are relaxed to permit the use of hearsay as well as evidence
that might be subject to exclusionary rules at trial. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 6, at 263-76; see also Arenella, supra note 50, at 541-58; Allred, Confrontation Rights
and Preliminary Hearings, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 75.
52. 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
53. Id. passim. The five concurring Justices in the plurality expressed some or all of these
concerns in their opinions.
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The Court subsequently upheld a series of state statutes which imposed
controls upon death sentencing discretion through combinations of (1) more
precise definitions of capital crimes, (2) requirements of proof of aggravating
circumstances with allowance for mitigating circumstances, (3) the separation
of procedures for determining guilt from those dealing with the penalty issue,
and (4) provisions for careful judicial review of death sentences.54 The Court
concluded that these additional substantive and procedural safeguards were
necessary (and, at present, sufficient) to avoid the evils identified in Furman.
The Court did not in these cases endorse capital punishment, but ac-
knowledged merely that the death sentencing schemes enacted by the state
legislatures in Georgia, Florida and Texas were not prima facie unconsti-
tutional.15 The Court thus held in Gregg v. Georgia56 that a prosecutor's
power to select those who will face death charges does not, by itself, render
a capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional.57 The Court did not declare,
however, that a prosecutor is free of any external restraint when deciding
who will be visited with the ordeal of a capital trial.
So long as a prosecutor can choose (and choose not) to file death charges
54. See supra notes 2, 4.
55. Prosecutors sometimes lose sight of the limited nature of the Supreme Court's death
penalty holdings and suggest to juries that the Court has endorsed capital punishment. The
prosecutor closing in State v. Resnover & Smith, No. CR80-442A (Marion Super. Ct., Crim.
Div. One, aff'd, 465 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. 1984), made the following argument (without objection
from defense counsel) which is transcribed in 13 Record of Proceedings 2460-61:
When we participate in a government we say there will be public justice, they
will come before a jury and if one of these people does something to me I'll file
a criminal charge and ask the prosecutor's office to let a jury decide. And a judge
decides what the punishment will be. And that is an important concept, because
the [Gregg] case[,l a U.S. Supreme Court case on the death penalty, says that
the reason for the death penalty means retribution. And retribution means we
will punish you for evildoing. Retribution means deserved punishment. And if
we get to a situation where as an organized society doing public justice we will
not give deserved punishment for evil done, then are we not back ... to private
justice[?] As the U.S. Supreme Court in the [Gregg] case has said, When a people
begin to believe that an organized society is unable or unwilling to impose on the
criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, then are [sown] the seeds of
anarchy, of self-help, vigilante justice and lynch law. Why go through this detailed
analysis of the death penalty if the facts so reasonably fit? Because the stakes
here are real high. Two men's lives and justice. And if we reach, as a society,
the conclusion that we will not produce punishment, consistent with the evil done,
then according to the U.S. Supreme Court, we plant the seeds of self-help and
vigilante justice.
The language used by the prosecutor does appear in Gregg, but is quoted by Justice Stewart
from his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 308 (1972). Gregg v. Georgia
428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). It is incorrect to suggest this to be the holding in Gregg, or even to
suggest that a majority of the Court has endorsed this sentiment. Only two other Justices
(Powell and Stevens) joined with Stewart in Gregg. The Supreme Court is, however, tolerant
of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments in death penalty cases. Darden v. Wainwright,
106 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 (1986). See also id. at 2476-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For further
discussion in the Resnover & Smith case see infra text accompanying notes 105-15.
56. 428 U.S. 153.
57. Id. at 199.
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in accordance with the prosecutor's own inclinations, the Court's assumption
that arbitrary and excessive death sentences can be controlled through the
formal requirements of trials and appeals will remain vulnerable to challenge.
Recently published data disclose what appears to be a steady increase in the
nation's death row population of some 200 to 300 persons per year,58 but
the data show also that the number of persons sentenced to death remains
relatively small when compared to those who could be tried and convicted
as capital offenders. 9 The authors of the study conclude: "The principal
reason for these low death sentencing rates among death eligible defendants
is no mystery. Through their extensive control of the process, both before
and after the guilt trial, prosecutors exclude the majority of death eligible
defendants from the group which actually undergoes a penalty trial.
' 6°
The dimension of the problem relevant to this Article is a concern that
prosecutors, aware of the advantages of a trial before a death qualified jury
and the leverage that death charges provide in plea bargaining, will initiate
capital cases without sufficient factual or legal support. The Court skirted
this issue in McCree.61 In dissent Justice Marshall expressed concern that
the "sweep of the Court's opinion ' 62 would foreclose examination of the
problem of prosecutorial abuse. He assumed "in any particular case, a
defendant will never be able to demonstrate with any certainty that the
prosecution's decision to seek the death penalty was merely a tactical ruse
.. ..63 As dissenters are wont to do, Justice Marshall overstates his point.
The following description of three Indiana cases discloses how the sometimes
excessive zeal of prosecutors, seeking either to "make their bones" on death
row or to obtain a tactical advantage, ought to be held in check through
effective pretrial screening procedures. Three cases do not an empirical study
make, but based upon my experience in each, 64 and my conversations with
58. Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 11, at 135.
59. Id. at 146-54.
60. Id. at 147.
61. The respondent in McCree attempted to focus the Court's attention on this problem, but
lacked the requisite "standing" because the prosecutor had not waived the death sentence
hearing in his case. 106 S. Ct. at 1766 n.16. The original habeas corpus petitioner, James
Grigsby, had preserved the issue in the district court. After the jury found him guilty of murder,
the state chose not to proceed with a death sentence hearing. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp.
1372, 1376 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (Grigsby 1), modified and aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985),
rev'd sub nom., Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). Grigsby died during the proceedings
and his case became moot.
62. 106 S. Ct. 1772 n.4.
63. Id. In view of this sentiment, I find puzzling the failure of Justice Marshall to dissent
from the Court's denial of certiorari in Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2245 (1986), in which a prosecutor was allowed to proceed to trial before
a death qualified jury without a prior showing of sufficient evidence to believe that a capital
offense had been committed. Earlier, Justice Marshall dissented from a denial of certiorari in
a case challenging the charging discretion of a prosecutor. Gacy v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 1410
(1985).
64. In State v. Kirkley, No. S85-S32 (Morgan Super. Ct., Morgan Cty., Ind.), I conferred
with defense counsel on the issue of the legal sufficiency of the death penalty charges, and
upon the constitutionality of the Indiana pretrial process in death penalty cases. See infra text
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lawyers throughout the state, I conclude that the prosecutorial practices
described below are not atypical. 65
2. Playing Prosecutor's Choice
The kinds of murders that excite a community's fervor for the death
penalty are, relatively speaking, rare occurences. An elected prosecutor's
choice to initiate a capital case cannot be divorced from the prosecutor's
desire for reelection. Absent the tempering influence of a neutral fact-finder,
a prosecutor may be motivated to respond more to a sense of the community's
fear and its demands for vengeance than to a rational evaluation of the
available evidence, and other relevant factors6 which should inform such a
critical decision. Even in larger communities where murders occur more
frequently, the greater publicity given to certain kinds of cases will bear
heavily upon the prosecutor's choice to seek the death penalty.
Indiana places the least permissible restraint upon a prosecutor's initiation
of murder charges and imposes no formal restraint upon initiation of the
death penalty process. 67 If an accused is arrested upon a warrant issued by
a judicial officer after an exparte determination of probable cause to believe
the accused has committed a crime, 68 no further screening of the charging
decision is required. If the arrest is without a warrant, the screening process
accompanying notes 71-85. In Rowan, 758 F.2d 1186, I served as defense counsel through trial
and subsequent appeals in state and federal courts. I represented the petitioner Tommie Smith
in Smith v. State, No. CR80-442A (Marion Super. Ct., Crim. Div. One, Marion Cty., Ind.),
aff'd, 465 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. 1984), on his Petition for Post Conviction Relief, but the petition
was denied September 29, 1986. Appellate procedures have been initiated. See also Resnover
v. State, 460 N.E.2d 922 (Ind.) (connected case), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
65. According to data supplied by the Indiana Public Defender Council, since 1979 there
have been fifty-five cases from twenty-eight counties in which death penalty charges were filed,
but which resulted in non-death penalty dispositions. Data are not available as to the outcomes
of these cases. The figures represent only cases known to the Indiana Public Defender Council.
The total number of cases falling into this category is probably somewhat higher.
66. Consideration should be given to factors such as the age of the accused, age of the
victim, relationship of accused to the victim, past criminal history and mental condition of the
accused, the circumstances of the homicide, and whether the circumstances of the crime are
similar to those in other capital cases in the same county or in other counties in the state. The
Supreme Court has ruled that a "proportionality" review is not required. Pulley v. Harris,
104 S. Ct. 871 (1984). See Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of
Proportionality Review, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1433 (1985).
These considerations are typically employed by prosecutors making charging decisions in an-
ticipation of successful prosecution. In a case that excites popular demand for capital punish-
ment, however, these legitimate considerations may be suppressed in favor of making a forceful
statement by filing capital charges.
67. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(a) (1982).
68. INrD. CODE § 35-33-2-1(b) (1982). The usual method by which the facts supporting the
determination of probable cause is submitted is the filing of an affidavit of an investigating
officer containing, in the main, hearsay. As an alternative, sworn oral testimony may be given
before a judicial officer.
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is the same except the ex parte finding of probable cause occurs after the
accused is in custody. 69 Whether the arrest is with or without a warrant, the
judicial inquiry is limited to the question of probable cause for an arrest.7
a. Openly Lying in Wait
Millicent Kirkley sat with a friend on a picnic table outside her estranged
husband's Martinsville, Indiana, workplace in the mid-afternoon sunlight of
April 16, 1985.71 She had concealed in her purse a loaded .22 calibre revolver
which she had taken from her father's dresser drawer. She and her husband,
Mark, the father of her children, had separated but continued to quarrel
over his relationships with other women. She talked to her friend about the
pain she was feeling. Mark had been married three times, said Millie, and
added that "he would not be married again."
Mark came out of the plant gate and walked north on an adjacent street.
Millie walked toward him. As they met she took the gun from her purse
and fired four shots at point blank range. Mark ran a short distance before
collapsing in a parking lot. Millie followed, then knelt and hugged Mark
saying, "Mark, I love you. What have I done? Oh, I shot you!" Mark died
of his wounds. Millie dropped the gun and stood nearby until the police
arrived and took her into custody.
The following day Millie's father delivered to the prosecutor a notebook
in which she had recorded thoughts about killing Mark in a "letter" headed
"Dear Family." The following portion was quoted in the probable cause
affidavit: "I was so lost and thought I couldn't go on without him. So I
wanted to leave this world. But then I realized that my boys would end up
with a low lifed scum of the earth that they loved but was to [sic] young
to understand what he was. So I lived on trying to cover for all the hurt
and the pain. But this night has made up my mind that someone like him
doesn't deserve to live and he will pay for what he has done to me."
Two days after the shooting the prosecutor filed an information charging
Millicent Kirkley with the murder of her husband. Included, on a separate
sheet as required by state law,72 was a death penalty information which
alleged as the necessary aggravating circumstance that the murder was com-
mitted "by lying in wait." 71
69. IND. CODE § 35-33-7-2 (1982).
70. Id.; see supra note 35.
71. The facts are taken from the probable cause affidavit signed by the investigating police
officer and submitted to the trial court by the prosecutor to support her request for an arrest
warrant charging the defendant with murder. The defendant was in custody at the time of the
proceedings.
72. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(a) (1982).
73. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (1982).
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The affidavit submitted in support of the arrest warrant provided a factual
basis for the murder charge. 74 However, the familiar tragedy of a jealous
wife killing her husband seems not the kind of homicide for which she should
be strapped in an electric chair that previously had accommodated a callous
kidnap-rapist killer of a young mother and her three children, 7 and a ghoulish
murderer for hire who, after repeatedly stabbing and beating his father-in-
law, dismembered his corpse in the presence, and with the aid, of other
members of his family.76
Defense counsel moved to dismiss the death penalty information, arguing
that the facts alleged in the probable cause affidavit could not support the
state's theory of "lying in wait. '" 77 There was no statutory definition of the
phrase in Indiana nor any prior case setting forth the evidentiary components
of "lying in wait." Other jurisdictions uniformly require proof of conceal-
ment in addition to waiting and watching for the victim. 7 The trial court
denied the motion finding "that the statutes governing this case do not allow,
the Court to determine whether or not probable cause exists as to [the death
penalty information].7 9
A week later the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in another death penalty
case that "the common law definition does apply in Indiana and the elements
necessary to constitute 'lying in wait' are watching, waiting, and concealment
from the person killed with the intent to kill or inflict bodily injury upon
that person."80
By its own allegations in the probable cause affidavit the state had fore-
closed a showing of "concealment" in the case of Millicent Kirkley. She
74. There are no "degrees" of murder in Indiana. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1982): " A
person who: (1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being; ... commits murder,
a felony."
75. Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981).
76. Vandiver v. State, 480 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 1985). In Judy and Vandiver the defendants
chose not to contest their death sentences and submitted "voluntarily" to electrocutions. Indiana
is the only mid-western state that has carried out executions. See DEATH Row, supra note 5,
at 4.
77. Motion to Dismiss, State v. Kirkley, No. S85-S32, (Morgan Super. Ct., Morgan Cty.,
Ind. 1985).
78. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 110 Ariz. 489, 520 P.2d 1113 (1974); People v. Merkouris,
46 Cal. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999 (1956); State v. Cross, 68 Iowa 180, 26 N.W. 62 (1885); Moser
v. State, 91 Nev. 809, 544 P.2d 424 (1975).
79. Entry and Order, State v. Kirkley, No. S85-S32 (Morgan Super Ct., Morgan Cty., Ind.
1985) (emphasis added); see supra note 35.
80. Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 546 (1985).
Davis was charged with the sexual molestation and murders of two boys on different occasions.
In one instance, the court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of "lying in wait"
because the defendant lurked in the dark on the side of the road and ambushed his victim. In
the second instance, the court found the evidence to be lacking even though the killer concealed
himself near a campsite waiting until the campers were asleep. He then went "openly" to the
victim's tent, woke him and forced the boy to a deserted area where the sexual assault and
the murder were committed. His death sentence for the second murder was upheld because a
second aggravating circumstance of intentional killing during the course of the felony of child
molesting had been established. Id. at 900-01.
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waited in the open, and in broad daylight. Within the view of her victim
husband, and of several others, she approached and shot him.,' Even so,
the prosecutor refused to withdraw the death penalty information until a
few days before the trial was to begin. 2
Given the nature of the offense and the prosecutor's delay in acknowl-
edging that she had no legal basis upon which to seek the death penalty, it
can be inferred that she sought the advantage of a death qualified jury for
two illegitimate reasons: first, to increase her chances of a murder conviction
given the tendency of the less conviction prone non-death qualified jury to
return voluntary manslaughter verdicts (if not outright aquittals) in such
cases;83 second, to maintain leverage for a guilty plea. 84
Millicent Kirkley stood trial for the murder of her husband and was
convicted by a non-death qualified jury of voluntary manslaughter.85
b. Hanging by a Fingerprint
The body of a 72-year old woman was discovered in the living room of
her home in Rockport, Indiana, in the late afternoon of January 7, 1979.86
She was nude from the waist down and her crumpled clothing was piled on
her abdomen. She had been dead for about twenty-four hours. The back
door to her house had been forced open and items of personal property,
including her wallet and car keys, were missing. An autopsy conducted the
following day revealed that she had suffered facial injuries that probably
resulted from blows, but that she had died of a cerebral hernhorrage caused
by a traumatic injury to the back of her head at the base of the skull. The
post-mortem examination disclosed also a small tear in the skin adjacent to
her sex organ. Subsequent tests for semen and foreign pubic hairs were
negative.
Investigation at the crime scene produced few clues as to the identity of
the intruder(s). A red pocket comb carrying advertising for a local business
81. The apparent rationale for classifying murders committed by "lying in wait" as capital
crimes is that waiting and watching for the victim evince premeditation, and concealment of
the killer until the moment of attack gives the intended victim no chance of escape.
82. There is nothing in Indiana law which would have required this action on the part of
the state. In light of the trial court's announced lack of authority to review the prosecutor's
decision to file the death charges, she could have insisted upon a trial before a death qualifiedjury and even proceeded to the death sentencing phase had she succeeded in obtaining a murder
conviction. See supra note 35.
83. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-3 (1982): "(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally kills
another human being while acting under qudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter."
84. According to defense counsel, the prosecutor was willing to recommend a 40 year prison
term if the defendant would plead guilty to murder.
85. See supra note 64.
86. The facts are taken from the trial transcript with which I am intimately familiar, having
tried the case for the defense and having handled all subsequent appeals. For judicial reporting
of the facts, see Rowan v. State, 431 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 1982); Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2245 (1986).
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college was found near the body. A single, partial hair (less than one-half
inch in length) was discovered on an inside panel of the back door which
had been forced open. In the victim's bedroom the police found the top of
her dresser in disarray. A Band-Aid container was laying on its side and
Band-Aids were scattered on the floor.
The detective in charge of the investigation sent the metal Band-Aid can to
the state police laboratory for fingerprint analysis. He also sent the finger-
print card of a local man, Tyreese Rowan, who was on probation after
having been convicted of burglarizing another woman's home in the same
town. About six weeks later the lab technicians reported that a fingerprint
had been discovered on the lid of the Band-Aid can and that it matched the
right little finger of the suspect Rowan.
Without further inquiry as to Rowan's whereabouts at the time of the
crimes, or whether he might have had innocent access to the Band-Aid con-
tainer, the prosecutor, within two days of receiving the fingerprint report,
filed an information charging him with murder,8 7 criminal deviate conduct, 8
and burglary.89 The prosecutor also filed a two count death penalty infor-
mation charging as the required aggravating circumstance that Rowan had
killed the victim "intentionally" while committing burglary and criminal
deviate conduct. 90 Under Indiana law such a charge requires proof that the
homicidal act be performed with the "conscious objective" of causing the
victim's death.9'
In a probable cause affidavit submitted to a local judge in support of an
application for an arrest warrant, the investigating detective detailed the
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the body and summarized the
contents of the autopsy report. The only statement in the affidavit linking
Rowan to the crime scene was the report that his fingerprint was found on
a Band-Aid can recovered from the victim's home. The judge issued a warrant
for Rowan's arrest for murder, burglary and criminal deviate conduct. No
finding of probable cause to support the separate death penalty charges was
made.
In his pretrial motions, Rowan sought dismissal of the death penalty
informations on the ground that the affidavit submitted by the state in
support of the application for an arrest warrant failed to establish probable
cause to believe he had killed the victim intentionally. The remedy he re-
quested was an adversarial preliminary hearing limited to the death penalty
counts. He maintained that the state ought not to be permitted to try him
before a death qualified jury without first establishing probable cause to
87. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(1) (1982).
88. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-2 (1982). This charge was based on the theory that Rowan inten-
tionally or knowingly penetrated the sex organ of the victim with some object.
89. IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (1982).
90. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (1982).
91. IND. CODE §§ 35-41-2-1(a), 35-41-2-2(a) (1982).
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believe that he was eligible for a death sentence. He also argued that no
rational person could infer that he had killed the victim intentionally from
the fact that his fingerprint was found on a moveable object discovered in
the victim's home.92
The trial court denied both requests and the state was permitted to death
qualify the jury from which thirteen otherwise qualified jurors were excluded
for cause solely because of their opposition to capital punishment. 9
By the time of trial, the state had some additional circumstantial evidence
to support its charges. 94 In addition to the fingerprint identification, 9 a state
police hair analyst testified that the hair found on the victim's back door
and samples taken from Rowan were similar in five characteristics and
92. While the presence of his fingerprint on an object in the house is relevant to whether
he was at some time present in the house, it is irrational, without more evidence, to infer from
that single fact that he (1) engaged in conduct that caused the death of the victim, and (2) did
so with the conscious objective of causing her death. See United States v. Van Fossen, 460
F.2d 38, 41 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Corso, 439 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1971); People v.
Van Zant, 405 N.E.2d 881 (I11. App. 1980), rev'd, 422 N.E.2d 605 (I11. App. 1981). See generally
Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Footprints As Evidence, 28 A.L.R.2d 1115, 1150-38
(1953), and later supplements.
Similar to Rowan, is Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982). Defendant's fingerprints,
and those of others, were found at the scene of execution-style murders. The state sought the
death penalty against Jaramillo, and a death qualified jury found him guilty of first degree
murder. The trial court rejected the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and sentenced
him to death. Id. The Florida Supreme Court not only vacated the death sentence, but ordered
the acquittal of the defendant because the fingerprint evidence was insufficient "to establish
that Jaramillo's fingerprints could have been placed on the items only at the time the murder
was committed." Id. See discussion of Jaramillo in Radelet, supra note 29, at 1428-30.
93. The trial judge also denied the defendant's request for individual voir dire. Prospective
jurors were questioned in groups of six to eight. The process lasted a week before a jury of
twelve and two alternates was seated. Each side exercised 16 of the 20 peremptory challenges
that were permitted. During this process I got the feeling, on more than one occasion, that
when prospective jurors learned they could be excused due to opposition to the death penalty,
there were some sudden conversions to the abolitionist cause. See infra notes 149-51 and
accompanying text.
94. Because of Indiana's liberal pretrial discovery rules the additional evidence produced
by the state was known to the defense in advance of trial.
95. While Rowan did not deny the fingerprint was his, one of the major issues explored
at trial was whether the print could have been placed on the object at some earlier time outside
the victim's home. It was established through a price tag on the can that it had been offered
for sale at a local self-service drugstore, but there was no evidence as to when it was sold or
to whom. The state could prove no chain of custody of this item from the uncertain time it
left the drug store shelf and the time it was discovered in the victim's bedroom. See generally
P. GtANELLI & E. IMWINKEUIED, SctENTn c EvIDENcE 201-29 (1986). It was established at trial
that there is no reliable way of determining the age of a fingerprint found on a metal object
such as the Band-Aid can. See Jaramillo, 407 So. 2d at 258; P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED,
supra at 545-46; A. MOENsSENS, FINGERPRIrrs AND THE LAw 26, 121-22 (1969); Barnett &
Berger, The Effects of Temperature and Humidity on the Permanency of Latent Fingerprints,
16 J. FolRENsic SCI. Soc'Y 249, 254 (1977). To sustain its theory the state had to convince the
jury that Rowan could have placed his fingerprint on the object at no time other than the
night of the crime. Rowan did not claim to have been in the victim's home at any relevant
time prior to her death. He denied any involvement in the crime, and had no explanation for
the presence of his fingerprint other than a claim that he must have come in contact with the
object at some earlier time outside the victim's home. One possibility, but not the only one,
is that he touched the can while it was still on the self-service shelf in the drugstore.
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therefore could have been of common origin. 96 An acquaintance of Rowan's
testifed that about three months prior to the crimes he had seen Rowan
with a red pocket comb that resembled the comb found near the victim's
body (he could not remember whether the comb had advertising on it). Forty-
nine days after the crimes, and three days after Rowan's arrest, the victim's
car keys were found in the yard across the street from Rowan's home. Two
witnesses, who came forward after his arrest, testified that they saw Rowan
within two blocks of the victim's house on the evening of the crime. 97
On the murder charge the jury found Rowan guilty of the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter thus obviating any question of a death
sentence; 98 he was convicted also of burglary and criminal deviate conduct. 99
In his appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, and in subsequent federal
habeas corpus proceedings, Rowan raised the issue of the state's improper
use of a death qualified jury to determine his guilt. He argued that he was
denied due process by the trial court's refusal to dismiss the death penalty
informations because of the absence of any showing by the state of probable
cause to believe that the case would progress to a death sentence hearing.
He argued also that the trial court's failure to address this issue in the
pretrial stages of the case could not have been cured by the trial itself
because, even with the additional circumstantial evidence presented against
him at trial, there was insufficient support for the state's charge that he had
96. Hair comparisons are effective to exclude suspects or to include a suspect within a class
of persons from whom the hair could have come. Rowan is black and there is less variation
in hair characteristics among blacks than among whites. See, e.g., Gaudette, Probabilities and
Human Pubic Hair Comparisons, 21 J. FORENSIC ScL 514, 517 (1976); Imwinkelried, Forensic
Hair Analysis: The Case Against Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 41, 49-50, 52, 61-62 (1982).
97. The proximity to the victim's house was not surprising because Rowan's house was not
far distant from the victim's.
98. This aberrational result requires explanation. The state chose not to invoke the felony
murder rule, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(2) (1982). The choices open to the jury on the homicide
charge were (1) to find the defendant guilty of murder on the basis of his having intentionally
or knowingly killed the victim, (2) not guilty, or (3) guilty of a lesser included offense. The
mens rea element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter is the same as murder, but the offense
is mitigated by proof of a killing in a "sudden heat." IND. CODE § 35-42-1-3 (1982). There
was no claim or proof in the record of a killing in "sudden heat." The only witness produced
by the state to support its theory of the sequence of events leading to the death of the victim
was the pathologist who performed the autopsy. He admitted that while the victim may have
suffered her fatal injury as a result of a direct blow, she may also have fallen back against a
protruding fireplace mantel in the living room after having been pushed or struck with moderate
force.
Given the ambiguity of the medical evidence upon which the state relied for proof of an
intentional or knowing homicide, it seems plausible to assume that the jury meant to find the
defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. This would have been
consistent with the backward fall hypothesis. At the time, Indiana permitted instructions in
murder cases embracing all lesser included homicide offenses, whether or not supported in the
record. The defendant requested the voluntary manslaughter instruction (along with other lesser
included offense instructions), and was not in a position to object when the jury returned a
verdict that obviated any further consideration of the death penalty.
99. Rowan was sentenced to consecutive terms for these crimes aggregating 90 years.
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struck the victim with the conscious objective of causing her death.1'°
The Indiana Supreme Court dealt with the issue summarily and treated
Rowan's argument concerning the improper use of the death qualified jury
as a challenge to the death qualification of juries in general.'0 ' He fared
little better in the United States Court of Appeals after the district court's
denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. Judge Richard Posner disposed
of the claim in a sentence:
[Rowan] has failed to show that the prosecutor acted either unreasonably
or in bad faith in screening the jury; for there was a fair chance that
the prosecution would be able to prove Rowan guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of 'intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting
to commit ... burglary ... [or] criminal deviate conduct,' . which
is a capital offense. 02
Judge Posner did not elaborate on how the matter stated in the probable
cause affidavit, or the additional evidence produced at trial, would have
supported this conclusion. Implicit in the observation, however, is a rec-
ognition that Rowan might have been entitled to a pretrial determination of
100. As to the appropriate standard of proof for the pretrial evaluation of the sufficiency
of evidence to support capital charges see infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
101. Rowan v. State, 431 N.E.2d at 818-19.
102. Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d at 1191. Judge Posner earlier in his opinion rejected Rowan's
claim that the evidence supporting his conviction for voluntary manslaughter was insufficient
under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 752 F.2d at 1188-90. He
reasoned that the combination of the pieces of circumstantial evidence, i.e., the fingerprint,
hair, red comb and car keys, supported the jury's conclusion that he had "knowingly" killed
the victim.
While the combination of circumstances might support an inference that Rowan was present
at the time of the crimes, to conclude that the state could have established in death penalty
sentencing proceedings that he acted with the necessary "conscious objective" of causing a death
would require two levels of inference based upon that already conditional fact. This may be
illustrated as follows:
If
(conditional fact I)
Rowan was present at the time and place
of the victim's fatal injury,
then
(inference I)
he probably engaged in some
conduct that caused her death.
If
(conditional fact 2)
he engaged in conduct that caused her death,
then
(inference 2)
he probably engaged in that conduct
with the conscious objective (i.e., the intent)
to cause her death.
Therefore
(conclusion)
he killed the victim intentionally.
See generally R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILrry 35, 39-40, 237-40, 261 (2d ed.
1983); IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 41, 1106-38 (Tillers rev. 1983); J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE
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probable cause to support the capital charges, but that failure to do so in
this instance was harmless error. 10 3 The United States Supreme Court, two
weeks after its ruling in McCree, denied Rowan's petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the issue. 104
c. A Quick Call
"It was a death penalty case when Jack hit the concrete," confided a
prosecutor during an informal discussion of the killing of Indianapolis Police
Sgt. Jack Ohrberg, and of the subsequent death sentences imposed upon
Tommie Smith and Gregory Resnover for his murder.
Ohrberg and several other police officers, in the pre-dawn hours of De-
cember 11, 1980, approached a duplex residence on the northeast side of
Indianapolis to serve an arrest warrant for Tommie Smith on charges of
armed robbery and felony murder.o 0 Ohrberg, dressed in street clothes, but
flanked by two uniformed officers and another detective, knocked on the
windowless front door and called out "Police!" He received no response.
After knocking and calling out "Police!" a second time he and other officers
went to the other half of the duplex and woke the woman tenant to ask if
she had seen or heard her neighbors. She told them that new tenants recently
had moved in and that she had heard movement in the other half of the
duplex before she had gone to bed for the night.
Sgt. Ohrberg returned to the first door; he knocked and called "Polke!"
once more. Still there was no answer. The front windows were covered and
the police could not see inside. Ohrberg, with his service revolver in hand,
lowered his shoulder to break through the door. On his first attempt the door
opened a few inches, but seemed to be blocked by something inside. He hit
the door again and succeeded in opening it wide enough to carry his body
partially into the house. At that point, the other officers heard gunshots in-
side the house. One officer reported seeing muzzle flashes from two different
OF JUDICIAL PROOF 14 (3d ed. 1937); Schum & Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on
Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 105 (1982).
103. There is an alarming trend in appellate court reliance upon the doctrine of harmless error,
As noted by Francis A. Allen:
One of the strongest impressions to be gained from reading a large number of
modem criminal appellate opinions,... is that courts of review are placing extra-
ordinary reliance on the doctrine of "harmless error" in affirming criminal convic-
tions. In 1970 Tom Clark, who as a retired member of the United States Supreme
Court was sitting on a federal court of appeals, observed that " '[h]armless error'
is swarming around the 7th Circuit like bees." The drone of the bees has not abated
in the intervening years.
Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts
of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311, 329 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
104. Rowan, 106 S. Ct. at 2245.
105. See Resnover v. State, 460 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984);
Smith v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. 1984). Both cases are being litigated in post-conviction
proceedings in the state courts. The facts stated are taken from the trial record.
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locations in the dark room. Ohrberg stepped back and announced to the other
officers that he had been hit. He slumped to the concrete porch. As the
shooting from inside continued, the other officers sought cover on either side
of the porch. They all agreed that Ohrberg remained on the porch laying either
on his stomach or his left side with his head toward the house and his feet
toward the street. His body, when viewed from the street, was to the left
of the front doorway.
The detective who had gone to the right off the porch and had flattened
himself against the brick wall of the house, testified that he then saw the
back of a person with a "medium afro" lean out the front door and, at a
range of about 12 to 18 inches, fire two shots from a rifle into the downed
body of Sgt. Ohrberg. He fired two shots from his .38 calibre service revolver
but missed as the figure ducked back into the house.
The two officers who had gone to the left off the porch when the shooting
started did not see a figure fire shots into the body of the downed officer.
One said he saw a figure come on to the porch from inside the house holding
a rifle at the "hip position" and fire right and left outward toward the
street. He returned fire with a single shot from his .357 Magnum revolver.
The second officer, who also had a full view of the porch from a short
distance away, stated that he did not see anyone either come out on the
porch or lean out of the doorway to fire additional shots.,01
The shooting lasted but a few seconds. Other officers arrived at the scene
and within a few minutes of the shooting a man inside called out, "Let's
talk." Negotiations proceeded with Ohrberg still laying on the porch. Soon
two men tossed weapons onto the porch (two AR15 semi-automatic rifles
and a handgun), and surrendered to the police. They were identified as
Gregory Resnover and his brother Earl Resnover. Two women who had
been spending the night with the Resnovers also came out of the house and
were arrested with the brothers. One of the men told police that a third
man (Smith) was wounded and was still inside.
Smith had been shot by Ohrberg as he forced his way into the house. 0 7
Unaware that Smith was unconscious, the police waited several minutes until
a SWAT team fired tear gas inside, then entered and secured the house.
Ohrberg was removed to the hospital where he was dead on arrival. Smith,
106. The statements from the three officers who witnessed the shooting were taken by
investigators between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on the day of the shooting. Their testimony
during the trial and in the post-conviction proceedings remained consistent with their original
statements. The significance of these statements is explored infra note 167.
107. Lawyers representing Smith and Gregory Resnover at their joint trial did not attempt
to explore the issue of who, Ohrberg, Smith or Resnover, had fired the first shot. During the
hearing on Smith's petition for post-conviction relief (attacking, inter alia, the competence of
his trial and appellate counsel), the police witnesses admitted that they could not, under the
terrifying circumstances, differentiate the sound of the shots coming from Ohrberg's .357
Magnum or the ARI5 rifles that were being fired from inside.
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who was thought to be dead when he was discovered, recovered from his
wounds.
The prosecutor and one of his deputies arrived at the scene shortly after
the arrests and after Ohrberg's body had been removed. They observed the
subsequent crime scene investigation which included a meticulous, and wat-
rantless, eight hour search of the interior of the house by an evidence
technician. The search resulted in the discovery of several spent shell casings
and a variety of weapons and related paraphernalia.10 s
The violent killing of a police officer naturally raises a stir in any com-
munity and a strong desire for revenge on the part of fellow police officers.
Under the influence of these factors, the prosecutor announced before day's
end his intention to seek the death penalty for Tommie Smith and the two
108. Despite the presence of two experienced prosecutors, no one thought to get a search
warrant. The Supreme Court had ruled in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), and later
reaffirmed in Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984), that there is no "murder scene"
exception to the general constitutional rule requiring warrants for extended searches of private
homes. By the time the evidence technician began his careful search of the house, it had been
fully "secured" by the SWAT team and no exigent circumstances were present. Forty-five
items seized from the house were introduced at trial without objection (on fourth amendment
grounds) from either Smith's lawyer or Resnover's. These items (and related testimony) included
the empty shell casings which were used to prove how many shots had been fired by the rifles
belonging to Smith and to Gregory Resnover. Other weapons, not involved in the shooting,
were introduced to support the state's additional charge that Smith and the Resnovers had for
weeks, or even months, prior to the morning of the shooting been conspiring to kill Ohrberg
to interdict his investigations of them. Smith's lawyer filed a perfunctory pretrial motion to
suppress evidence seized from the house, but never requested an evidentiary hearing on the
motion. He failed to object to the admission of the evidence. Smith's new lawyer on appeal
attempted to argue the fourth amendment issue, but had no record upon which to premise his
claim. The Indiana Supreme Court declared that Smith lacked standing to raise a fourth
amendment objection to the admission of the evidence. Smith v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1105, 1122-
23 (Ind. 1984).
At his post-conviction hearing Smith showed that he had been living in the house and had
moved all his personal belongings into the house, including furniture and appliances. He had
a key and could come and go as he pleased. The inventory of items seized from the house is
several pages in length. Practically all of the property belonged to Smith. Had counsel raised
the issue at trial, Smith could have established standing to challenge the legality of the search
and the admission of the 45 state exhibits. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Without the
evidence the state's case would have been weakened considerably-particularly as to the
conspiracy charge.
During the last term the Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner is not barred, by
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), from raising a sixth amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based upon counsel's failure to assert a valid fourth amendment challenge
to illegally seized evidence in the state courts. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574
(1986). Such an error warrants reversal of a conviction only if the defendant can "prove that
his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual
prejudice." Id. at 2583.
It was established that Smith had been wounded in his right thigh by a fragment of a bullet
fired from Ohrberg's pistol which had pierced, from front to back, the ammunition clip of an
AR15 rifle found next to the unconscious Smith. This suggests that Ohrberg either fired his
gun as he entered the house, or at the same time as shots were being fired at him from the
inside.
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Resnovers.'09 Murder charges and death penalty informations were filed the
following day. The aggravating circumstance alleged in the death penalty
informations was that the victim of the murder was a law enforcement
officer acting in the course of duty." 0 In addition to the murder charges,
the state filed against the three men and the two women who had been in
the house with them charges of conspiracy to murder Sgt. Ohrberg."'
An ex parte probable cause hearing was conducted orally before a local
judge. No transcript of the hearing was preserved."12 The only evidence of
"conspiracy" available to the state at the time was that: (1) the five defend-
ants were spending the night together; (2) several weapons, amounts of
ammunition and assorted paraphernalia were found in the house; (3) shots
had been fired toward the police from two sources within the house; and
(4) one of Sgt. Ohrberg's printed business cards was found in the wallet of
one of the suspects, Earl Resnover, after his arrest. Hand printed on the
back of the card was the name of Ohrberg's wife and his home telephone
number." '3
The two women, whose only connection with the shooting had been their
misfortune to sleep that night with the Resnovers, were kept in jail for
several months. The prosecutors interrogated the women for information
that they hoped would support their theory that Smith and the Resnovers
had, over a period of time, plotted to kill Ohrberg to stop his investigations
of them; that they had amassed the weapons in the house for that purpose;
and were on the fatal morning calmly waiting to be surrounded by police
so as to carry out their conspiratorial objective. One of the women eventually
told the prosecutors that, at some time on the night before the shooting,
Gregory Resnover had remarked that if "he [Ohrberg] didn't come by soon
he [Resnover] was going to go home." She and the other woman were then
released and the conspiracy charges against them were dropped. At trial the
witness testified that she had lied about this statement to avoid being sent
to prison. ' 4
109. Indianapolis Star, December 12, 1980, at 1, col. 3 (to make this morning edition the
announcement must have been made on December 11, 1980).
110. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (1982).
111. IND. CODE § 35-41-5-2 (1982). Conspiracy to commit murder is a Class A felony for
which the minimum prison term is 20 years and the maximum is 50 years. IND. CODE § 35-
50-2-4 (1982).
112. Defense counsel did not request a transcript of the tape recorded hearing. The tape has
been erased, and no record of the probable cause hearing is available.
113. The state attached a sinister significance to the possession of the business card and the
notation on the back. The prosecutors claimed that the conspiracy included a plan to harm
Ohrberg's wife. It turned out that Ohrberg had given his card to a Resnover family member
during earlier investigations with a request that Earl Resnover get in touch with him if he had
information he wanted to provide concerning an earlier bank robbery in which his brother
Aaron had been shot and killed by a bank guard. Ohrberg's home telephone number was listed
under his wife's name in the local directory.
114. The only other evidence of the "long term" conspiracy to murder Ohrberg presented
by the state at trial was a statement of Smith mnde in a telephone conversation with an inmate
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Shortly before trial Earl Resnover's case was severed from that of his
brother and Smith. Gregory Resnover and Smith were tried jointly. They
were convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder and were sen-
tenced to death."5
The support which the three cases discussed above provide for my proposal
for constitutionally mandated preliminary screening procedures in death pen-
alty cases will be explored after an examination of the current status of the
law.
C. Constitutional Doctrine Applicable to Pre-Trial Screening of
Death Penalty Charges
The Supreme Court has on few occasions reviewed the question whether
considerations of due process require states to provide some neutral buffer
between the decision of the prosecutor to file charges and the trial of an
accused." 6 On two of these occasions the petitioners had been sentenced to
death in state courts.
In Hurtado v. California,"' the Court addressed, for the first time, an
issue which was to become a cornerstone of its criminal process jurisprudence
in the 1960's and 1970's. That issue is to what extent, if at all, are the specific
procedural protections accorded to the accused by the fourth, fifth, sixth
and eighth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 8
Hurtado challenged the constitutionality of his murder conviction and
death sentence, claiming that he had been denied his fourteenth amendment
right to due process of law in California because he had been tried upon a
prosecutor's information rather than an indictment by a grand jury. He
argued that the grand jury indictment, which was required by a specific
provision of the fifth amendment, was a part of the fundamental law of
in the local jail, and which took place two or three days prior to Ohrberg's death. The inmate
was one of Smith's alleged accomplices in an earlier robbery. They discussed Ohrberg's inves-
tigation of the robbery. Smith expressed doubts that Ohrberg had any solid evidence to implicate
him in the crime. Smith, according to the witness (who was able to obtain a favorable deal
on his own charges in exchange for his testimony against Smith), then said: "[B]ut don't worry
about that, 'cause if the dude keep on goin' at it ... he's gonna come up missin'." Record
of Proceedings at 1854-55, State v. Resnover and Smith, CRS0-442A (Marion Super. Ct., Crim.
Div. One).
115. They each were given an additional 50-year prison term on the conspiracy count.
116. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962);
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 9 (1914); Lem Woon v. Oregon 229 U.S. 586 (1913);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
117. 110 U.S. 516.
118. For a survey of the cases examining "incorporationist" doctrine see Y. KAmISAR, W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 39-49.
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the land which, by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, could not be discarded by the states." '9
With one dissent 20 the Court, for whose members the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment was then a living memory, rejected the claim. The
decision was premised upon historical analysis extending to the text of Magna
Charta.' 2' The Court found within this historical record proof that prose-
cution by information was permitted in England at the time of the inde-
pendence of the American colonies. '2 Even assuming, however, the venerable
tradition of the grand jury and its general use both in England and the
United States, all jurisdictions were not locked into a single form for initiating
criminal prosecutions:
It is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical legal in-
stitutions to say that the spirit of personal liberty and individual right,
which they embodied, was preserved and developed by a progressive
growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the
forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new expression
and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government. 2'
Returning to the text of the Constitution, the Court reasoned that the
drafters of the fifth amendment, when incorporating a general guarantee of
due process of law, did not mean to include within that term the more
specific guarantees, including the right to grand jury indictment, that were
listed in the amendment. "Due process" was intended as a reference to the
"law of the land" as enacted by Congress and as "interpreted according to
the principles of the common law."' 4 The use of the identical phrase in the
fourteenth amendment required the same interpretation with respect to the
legislative powers of the states "exerted within the limits of those funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the
right of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleas-
ure. "21S
When "[t]ried by these principles," the Court was "unable to say" that
119. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 521.
120. Id. at 530 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Field did not participate in the decision.
121. Id. at 522-32.
122. Id. at 538.
123. Id. at 530. The Court later observed:
There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public
right and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every
age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its
inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources
of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the
new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and
shape it into new and not less useful forms.
Id. at 531.
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id.
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the prosecution of a murder by information "after examination and com-
mitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant,
with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination
of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law. ",' 26
The Court did not return to the subject of due process in state pretrial
proceedings until almost thirty years later in the case of Lem Woon v.
Oregon. 27 Lem Woon had been tried and sentenced to death for murder,
having been first charged in a prosecutor's information. He challenged the
constitutionality of the state law which permitted this process without any
form of preliminary examination by a magistrate. In contrast to the scholarly
opinions in Hurtado, the Court's response in Lem Woon was curt and
conclusive:
But since, as this court has so often held, the "due process of law"
clause does not require the State to adopt the institution and procedure
of a grand jury, we are unable to see upon what theory it can be held
that an examination, or the opportunity for one, prior to the formal
accusation by the district attorney, is obligatory upon the States.'"'
The Court did not examine Hurtado closely before freeing state prosecutors
of any restraints in the charging process. The Court's laborious examination
of the historical use of the grand jury was, in Hurtado, premised upon a
recognition of the need for some neutral intervention between the accused
and the state. It recognized an accused prisoner's "substantial interest"'129
in preliminary screening of some kind, but the form of the process by which
that interest is protected may vary from state to state so long as "principles
of liberty and justice"'130 are preserved. The Court's toleration of California's
dispensation of the grand jury was based upon that state's having provided
an adequate substitute for grand jury screening by way of a judicially
conducted adversarial preliminary hearing. While it may be that a state could
have satisfied the demands of due process by providing less than all of the
incidents of the adversarial preliminary hearing adopted in California, the
failure of the Lem Woon Court to see in Hurtado a constitutional basis for
some form of insulation from prosecutorial fervor is, I submit, symptomatic
of a severe case of judicial myopia.
In the period between the Court's death penalty rulings in Furman and
Gregg, the Court ruled in Gerstein v. Pugh'3' that the fourth amendment,
via the fourteenth, required a showing of probable cause before any arrestee
could be held in custody pending trial upon a prosecutor's information and
126. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
127. 229 U.S. 586.
128. Id. at 590.
129. 110 U.S. at 538.
130. Id. at 537.
131. 420 U.S. 103.
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that such a showing must be made to a judicial officer. 3 2 Since the interest
of the accused to be protected is freedom from unlawful detention, the
procedures and standards that governed the issuance of an arrest warrant
were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. Thus, an ex parte
determination of probable cause made before or after an arrest was all that
the fourth amendment required.
The Court rejected the district court's holding that a proper protection
of an arrestee's interest in pretrial freedom required a post-arrest adversarial
preliminary hearing at which the accused would be entitled to be represented
by counsel, to cross-examine state witnesses, to employ compulsory process
to summon witnesses on the accused's behalf, and to a transcript of the
proceedings if requested. 33 While recognizing that these procedures were
typical of those used in several states to determine whether a person charged
by information should be compelled to stand trial or, at least, have his or
her case presented to a grand jury, the Court found them not to be essential
to the probable cause determination required by the fourth amendment.
"The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested
person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably
without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest.' 3 4
The Court concluded that the use of this informal procedure was justified
for two reasons: (1) all that is at issue at such an early stage of the process
is the state's authority to continue the custody of the accused pending trial
at which all of the accused's rights will be protected through the adversarial
process; and (2) the decision to authorize detention pending further pro-
ceedings "does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that
a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and cred-
ibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence
supports a reasonable belief in guilt. ' 1 31
An inference to be drawn from this rationale is that as the consequences
of the exercise of a prosecutor's charging decision increase so must the
procedural protections against the abuse of that power. In Pugh the Court
found that the determination of probable cause for arrest is not a "critical
stage" of the criminal process requiring the assistance of counsel, and that
the availability of confrontation and cross-examination of state witnesses
would have too slight an impact upon the outcome of the determination to
support the imposition of such procedures as a constitutional requirement.'3 6
Pugh was a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
132. Id. at 114.
133. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
modified, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975)).
134. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120 (reasonable grounds (probability) to believe an offense has
been committed by the accused).
135. Id. at 121.
136. Id. at 121-22.
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involved no prisoner charged with a capital crime. Indeed, Florida, whose
pretrial procedures were under attack, permitted capital cases to be charged
only by grand jury indictment.'3 7 The majority nonetheless felt compelled
to breathe new life into Lem Woon, stating: "we do not imply that the
accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prose-
cute .... [W]e adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing
is not prerequisite to prosecution by information."' 3
Characterizing the preceding statements as dicta, Justice Stewart, joined
by three others, 3 9 argued that the Court ought not, "in the abstract, attempt
to specify those procedural protections that constitutionally need not be
accorded incarcerated suspects awaiting trial."'14 Perhaps anticipating in
some general sense the kind of problem presented by the state's unreviewed
access to death qualified juries, the four concurring Justices refused to join
"the Court's effort to foreclose any claim that the traditional requirements
of constitutional due process are applicable in the context of pretrial deten-
tio n .'' 4 ,
It seems timely for the Court to reexamine its dicta in Pugh and to overrule
Lem Woon to the extent that it permits prosecutors to file death penalty
charges by information without any form of judicial or grand jury inter-
vention. Since the Court in McCree has acknowledged that trial of one's
guilt or innocence by a death qualified jury increases a defendant's chances
of conviction, the consequences of the prosecutor's choice to invoke death
penalty procedures are of sufficient magnitude to justify a constitutionally
based requirement that states adopt procedures adequate to assure that
prosecutors have a legitimate basis for seeking a jury composed only of
persons who tolerate capital punishment. If a prosecutor cannot be trusted
to order the arrest of a person merely upon that prosecutor's sworn statement
that the accused has committed an offense, 42 surely a prosecutor should not
be allowed to dictate, by the mere act of filing a capital charge, that a
"somewhat more conviction prone" jury will determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
The state's ability to stack the jury against the accused through the death
qualification process is even greater than the majority in McCree was willing
137. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15. A requirement of prosecution by indictment is not alone a
sufficient protection against prosecutorial abuse of death penalty proceedings. See Jaramillo v.
State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982).
138. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119 (citations omitted).
139. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 126.
140. Id. at 126 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 127. Justice Stewart perceived irony in the Court's gratuitous statement that:
[Tlhe Constitution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human
being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank
account, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601; the custody
of a refrigerator, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600; the temporary
suspension of a public school student, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565; or the
suspension of a driver's license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535.
Id.
142. Id. at 117.
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to acknowledge. For example, in Indiana each side is accorded twenty per-
emptory challenges in a death penalty case, as opposed to ten in a non-
capital case. 43 The prosecutor will challenge peremptorily prospective jurors
whose doubts about the death penalty are not sufficiently strong to justify
exclusion by way of the Witherspoon/Witt'4 criteria, thereby increasing the
jury's tilt toward the state. 45 Since the percentage of persons disfavoring
capital punishment is decreasing, and the remaining "scrupled" population
is likely to include, proportionately, more women, blacks, hispanics and
economically underprivileged persons,'4 the state will not only be able to
exclude most of the "soft" jurors, but also to distort the representativeness
of the jury. 47 The defendant, on the other hand, is likely soon to run out
of his or her equal number of peremptory challenges if the defendant exercises
them to exclude people who favor the death penalty. The defendant will,
in the end, be able to exclude only the most avid capital punishment de-
votees.'
48
An important study' 49 mentioned in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in McCree
revealed a "process effect" of death qualification. Voir dire examination,
143. IND. CODE §§ 35-37-1-3, 35-37-1-4 (1982).
144. See supra note 7.
145. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
146. The national opinion poll figures in the ten year period 1972-1982 show a dramatic
increase in the percentage of persons who favor capital punishment. In 1972, 53 percent of
the sample population favored the death penalty for murder (39 percent were opposed, 8 percent
undecided). By 1982, 74 percent favored the death penalty (20 percent were opposed and 6
percent were undecided). In 1972, 35 percent of the white population sample opposed capital
punishment while 62 percent of blacks and other racial minorities were opposed (a 27 percent
difference between races). By 1982, those opposed had decreased to 18 percent whites and 42
percent blacks and other races (a 24 percent difference). Likewise, the number of female
opponents in 1972 was 10 percent higher than male opponents (44 percent and 34 percent
respectively). By 1982, the gap between the sexes in death penalty opposition had decreased to
8 percent. More significantly, the total percentage of death penalty opponents had in the ten-
year period dropped to 16 percent among males and to 24 percent among females. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 242-43 (1984). The figures show also
that opposition to capital punishment is inversely related to economic status. Id.
Recently reported results of a Media General-Associated Press Poll showed that 86% of the
respondents supported the death penalty for some crimes. One-third of the blacks polled felt
there should be no death penalty, whereas only 9% of the white respondents were totally opposed
to capital punishment. Indianapolis Star, Jan 12, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
147. This result is likely to blunt the effect of Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986),
which prohibits prosecutors from exercising a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race.
An adept voir dire examination of a prospective black juror is likely to reveal at least some
ambivalence toward the death penalty and thereby provide a less overtly racial reason for a
peremptory challenge.
148. The defendant may exclude for cause a juror who admits that he would vote auto-
maticallyfor the death penalty without regard to the evidence. See Hovey v. Superior Court,
28 Cal. 3d 1, 63-69, 616 P.2d 1301, 1343-46, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 170-74 (1984). The number
of persons subject to such a defense challenge is quite small. Kadane, After Hovey: A Note
on Taking Account of the Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 115 (1984).
149. Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death Qualification
Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 121 (1984); Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further
Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984).
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concentrating as it must upon issues surrounding jurors' attitudes toward
the death penalty, has its own biasing impact. The message the jurors are
likely to receive through this process is that the real issue in the case is not
the guilt or innocence of the accused, but whether, once convicted, the
offender should be put to death. Hence, jurors who have been subjected to
the process of death qualification will have a greater tendency to convict
the accused than will similar jurors who have not had that experience.'1 °
This concern persuaded the California Supreme Court to require individual
voir dire of prospective jurors in capital cases to reduce the biasing effect
of the constant repetition of questions about the death penalty, and the
effect of witnessing the exclusion of jurors found to be unqualified because
of their opposition to capital punishment."'
The combination of these factors which may influence a capital jury to
favor convicting the accused should not be tolerated unless the state can
demonstrate to a neutral decision-maker that its legitimate interests in seeking
the death penalty outweigh the interests of a defendant seeking a fair trial.
This leaves for consideration the kind of preliminary proceeding that will
satisfy the minimum standards of due process of law, and the appropriate
evidentiary standard by which the state's right to a death qualified jury must
be measured. In conducting this examination we will return to the three
Indiana cases discussed above to determine whether the imposition of pro-
cedural restraints upon prosecutorial discretion could have made a difference
either in the outcomes of any of the cases or, at least, in the acceptability
of the results.
II. SUGGESTIONS OF FORM AND CONTENT OF DEATH PENALTY
SCREENING PROCEDURES
A. Would Preliminary Screening Make a Difference?
The function of a preliminary inquiry in a capital case should be to test
both the factual support for the state's death penalty request and the validity
of the legal theory upon which the state seeks to proceed. The three cases
discussed above'52 demonstrate in different ways how preliminary screening
proceedings can serve to inhibit prosecutors' misuse of the death penalty
processes.
In Kirkley a simple comparison of the probable cause affidavit with the
aggravating circumstance alleged in the death penalty information would
150. See Haney, supra note 149, at 131-32.
151. Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 69-81, 616 P.2d at 1347-55, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 174-82. Professor
Haney, in a post-Hovey article, expresses doubts about the effectiveness of this attempt to cure
the process effect. See Haney, supra note 149, at 147-51.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 64-115.
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have revealed that the state lacked factual grounds to seek a death penalty.
In Rowan the probable cause affidavit, linking the suspect to the crime by
a single fingerprint on a portable object, also fell short of establishing
reasonable grounds to believe the victim had been killed intentionally (as
opposed to "recklessly" or even "knowingly"), 53 during the course of the
alleged felonies of burglary and criminal deviate conduct. The state should
certainly be free to allege additional facts which would render the accused
eligible for a death sentence. The state should not, however, be allowed to
try an accused before a death qualified jury without making a showing of
reasonable cause to expect that the jury impanelled to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused will later be called upon to consider the death
sentence.
The state in Rowan did not produce at trial sufficient evidence of an
intentional killing. 5 4 Rowan's case illustrates a situation in which the state
may well have been able to obtain a conviction based upon equivocal cir-
cumstantial evidence because of the nature of the jury before which Rowan
was tried.' 5
The Smith and Resnover case presents different issues in the context of
preliminary screening. First, while the death penalty informations in Kirkley
and Rowan were facially valid in that each contained an allegation of a
valid statutory aggravating circumstance, the informations filed against Smith
and Resnover were vulnerable to a legal challenge which should have been
resolved unambiguously in preliminary proceedings. The aggravating circum-
stance alleged in Smith and Resnover was that the murder victim was a
police officer acting in the "course of his duty" at the time of his death.
The statute attaches no "scienter" element to this aggravator, i.e., there is
153. IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2 (1982 & Supp. 1986):
(a) A person engages in conduct "intentionally" if, when he engages in the con-
duct, it is his conscious objective to do so.
(b) A person engages in conduct "knowingly" if, when he engages in the con-
duct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
(c) A person engages in conduct "recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in
plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the
disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.
154. See supra note 102.
155. See Finch & Ferraro, supra note 17, at 60:
[tihe empirical evidence seems too consistent to deny that death qualification will
ex proplo vigore alter the outcome in at least some capital cases. Furthermore,
what might be a relatively small proportion of cases may constitute a numerically
significant number of capital defendants whose convictions are the incidental
product of a jury selection process.
The authors speculate that the greatest effect of death qualification will be in cases where the
question of guilt or innocence is close. "In such cases, the ambiguity of proof may be such
that juror traits can influence verdict choices, and the probability that death qualification will
destroy an acquittal minority is greatest." Id. Cf. Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982).
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. Ray. 1611 (1985).
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
no requirement that the state prove that a defendant knew or had reason
to know that the victim was a police officer.
There are legitimate bases for a judicially imposed scienter element when
the presence of an aggravating circumstance depends upon the identity and
status of the victim. There are two reasons for imposing the death penalty
for the murder of an on-duty police officer. The first is to protect public
servants whose jobs expose them to homicidal risks by increasing the deterrent
effect of the threatened penalty. If the accused is not aware, however, that
the victim is a police officer, it is hard to understand how the additional
deterrent could become operative. If a person kills another during an armed
robbery'16 who happens to be an on-duty officer in plain clothes responding
to the robbery call, but the accused is unaware of the victim's status, the
killing cannot be distinguished from that of any other person who may have
been killed during the robbery.17 The crime is reprehensible and deserves
severe punishment, but capital punishment for the killing of the police officer,
without an element of scienter, would make the death penalty depend upon
happenstance.
A second reason supporting such an aggravating circumstance is that the
murder of a police officer merits death as a punishment because of the
greater culpability of a killer who is impervious to established order. This
rationale also can apply only to one who kills an officer knowing his
identity.' 8
The Indiana Supreme Court has so far avoided a definitive ruling upon
the need for the state to establish scienter when asserting the murder of an
on-duty police officer as an aggravating circumstance. In the cases to date,
the court simply has observed that if guilty knowledge were a required
element of proof, it had been established in the case under consideration.'5 9
This kind of fact finding by an appellate court is inconsistent with the
rationale of the United States Supreme Court's death penalty cases,1'6 which
156. This would fall under the felony-murder rule without regard to whether the killing was
intentional, knowing, reckless or even "accidental." IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(2) (1982).
157. This is not to say that the death penalty may not be sought for a murder committed
during a robbery. However, it must be established that such a killing was "intentional" and
not merely a product of the felony. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (1982).
158. A defendant, who is aware his potential victim is a police officer, need not be aware
that the officer is in fact performing his duty. This seems a risk that the killers of policy may
have imposed upon them.
159. Moore v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1264, 1276 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 583 (1985);
Averhart v. State, 470 N.E.2d 666, 695 (Ind. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2051 (1985);
Resnover, 460 N.E.2d at 930. But see State v. Compton, 38 Crim. L. Rep. 2455 (N.M. 1986).
In Compton the court's reliance upon United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975), to justify
the lack of a scienter requirement in a death penalty case is misplaced. The charge in Feola
was conspiracy to assault a federal officer. The Court held that defendant's knowledge of the
officer's status was not an element of the crime. However, in Feola the status of the officer
was a federal jurisdictional issue rather than a culpability issue. Feola cannot be read as an
authorization to dispense with the scienter element in death penalty cases where eligibility for
capital punishment is determined by the status of the victim.
160. See supra notes 2, 4.
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emphasizes the need for careful fact finding at the trial level. A death penalty
defendant is entitled to know going into trial what the state must prove,
what the content of the jury instructions defining the aggravating circum-
stance will be, and what findings of fact will be necessary to sustain a death
sentence.' 6
Smith and Resnover involved a second question concerning the legal suf-
ficiency of the charged aggravating circumstance of murdering a police officer
"in the course of his duty," which also should have been resolved in
preliminary proceedings. While Sgt. Ohrberg had knocked and announced
"Police!" before breaking into Smith's house, he did not, as required by
statute, 62 announce his purpose for demanding entry. Since there were no
demonstrable exigent circumstances that would have excused the failure of
the police to announce they had a warrant for Smith's arrest before breaking
down his door, the forcible entry was in violation of the statute. 6 The
important legal question raised by these facts is whether the aggravating
circumstance of murdering a police officer in the course of his duty may
be applied in a case in which the officer precipitates a violent response by
his own unlawful behavior. In short, may an officer be deemed to be acting
in the course of his duty when he is engaged in a causally related unlawful
act at the time of his death?' 64 This issue was not raised during the trial or
161. In Smith and Resnover these issues were hopelessly confused. When ruling on the
content of preliminary instructions the trial judge found that knowledge of the identity of the
victim as a police officer was a necessary element of the aggravating circumstance. One of the
preliminary instructions contained that element as did one of the final instructions. However,
several other final instructions on the same subject did not include a scienter element. None
of the verdict forms submitted to the jury contained a finding of scienter. The trial judge's
oral and written findings of fact, which are the bases upon which the death sentence is imposed,
did not contain a finding that the defendants knew their victim was a police officer. While the
state had produced evidence to support such a finding, there was conflicting evidence on that
issue in the record.
162. IND. CODE § 35-33-2-3(b) (1982).
163. See People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. I (Cal. 1968);
Cannon v. State, 414 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. App. 1980); Harrison v. State, 424 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind.
App. 1981).
164. The Indiana Supreme Court seems recently to have answered the question in the negative.
In Spranger v. State, 498 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. 1986), the court before upholding a death sentence
imposed upon an 18-year-old male for having murdered a police officer acting in the course
of his duty, found it necessary first to determine whether the victim (a town marshall) was
within the geographical limits of his arresting jurisdiction. If the murder of a police officer who
is technically outside his arresting jurisdiction does not qualify his killer for a death sentence
because such an officer cannot be regarded as acting within the scope of his duty, surely an
officer who is killed while violating a statute enacted both for his own protection and to
preserve the rights of the person subject to arrest cannot be found to be acting within "the
lawful course of [his] duty." Id. at 942.
A reason for the requirement of announcement of both authority and purpose before forcible
entry is to preclude violent response from an occupant who may perceive his person, family,
and home to be under attack. See, e.g., Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81 (Fla. App. 1973);
State v. Bishop, 288 Or. 349, 605 P.2d 642 (1980); State v. Olson, 34 Or. App. 571, 579 P.2d
277 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 287 Or. 157, 598 P.2d 670 (1979). See generally 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE 397, 400 (1978).
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
on direct appeal. Nonetheless, it is the type of issue that competent counsel
should be able to present in the pretrial stages of a death penalty case, and
which could obviate the death penalty procedures.
Finally, a requirement of preliminary screening of death penalty charges
will prevent the unseemly haste with which the prosecutorial decision was
made in Smith and Resnover.'6 Having committed himself so early to the
execution of the suspects, the prosecutor would have found it difficult to
back off even when subsequent investigation might have revealed his initial
instincts to have been questionable. After his "quick call" and a public
announcement, his incentive was to build a case against the accused and not
to conduct an objective investigation.'6 A requirement of independent pre-
liminary review will provide, if nothing else, a cooling period during which
the charging decision can be considered carefully. 67 The level of public
165. See supra text at notes 110-14. Another factual issue arising in capital cases and which
is well-suited for preliminary screening is that recognized in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982). In Enmund the Court ruled that the eighth amendment forbids the imposition of the
death penalty on "one who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed
by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be employed." Id. at 797; see also Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689
(1986). A state has no legitimate interest in trying before a death qualified jury an accused for
whom probable cause as to the Enmund factors is lacking.
166. The conspiracy charges based upon the state's theory of a long term plan to kill Sgt.
Ohrberg to stop his investigation appear to have been highly contrived. Under this theory,
however, the state was able to include in the record certain hearsay statements of alleged co-
conspirators, and the weapons and ammunition found in the house, but which were not used
in the shooting. Smith, 465 N.E.2d at 1121, 1124-25. Unfortunately, the issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence of "long term" conspiracy was never properly presented to the Indiana Supreme
Court. In affirming the conspiracy conviction, the court seems to have relied upon a "spon-
taneous conspiracy" theory which is at odds with the state's claims during all phases of the
trial. Id. at 1121 ("there is at least circumstantial evidence of the existence of a conspiracy
when two men who are aware that a policeman is entering the building suddenly and without
warning open coordinated gunfire on the police officer.").
167. The media coverage that attended the shooting heavily emphasized the claim that one
of the defendants, assumed to be Smith, deliberately shot the victim twice at close range- after
he had fallen to the porch. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08. However, only one of
the eyewitnesses claimed to have seen this happen. Id. All of the officers were quite clear that
when he fell, Sgt. Ohrberg lay on his left side or abdomen with his head toward the house.
This would have presented his right side to the doorway from which the two other shots were
fired. The two wounds supposedly inflicted while Ohrberg lay helpless on the porch were on
his left side. Those wounds could not have been inflicted in the manner presented (indeed
emphasized) by the state at trial.
Defense counsel apparently did not read the autopsy report carefully nor compare the pho-
tographs and descriptions of the wounds with the police officers' testimony. They did not cross-
examine the pathologist presented by the state who after describing the three wounds, stated
his opinion that the cause of death was "multiple gunshot wounds." 9 Record of Proceedings
at 1731. The state made no attempt to demonstrate the consistency of the two side wounds
with the testimony of the officers. Id. at 1727-41. The theory of the state as to the source of
the two side wounds was unchallenged at trial and led to the following unchallenged closing
argument by the prosecutor:
Now, what about Tommie. Tommie signed his name for us and we owe Tommie
a debt of gratitude. Because Tommie couldn't be satisfied with tearing Jack's
guts apart [with] that first shot. Oh, no. He's got to play super-fly and come
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acceptability of the decision also will increase because of the perceived
objectivity of neutral review.
The advantages of screening out cases that do not legally or factually
justify a death sentencing proceeding and, hence, a death qualified jury,
flow not only to the accused, but to the public. Death penalty trials are
very expensive. 68 Jury selection procedures take longer because of the death
qualification process. The trial is likely to consume more time and resources
because of the nature of the penalty. In most cases, the jurors (including
alternates) will be sequestered to keep them free of the taint of the heavy
publicity that surrounds such trials. Most death penalty defendants are
indigent and will require the services of public defenders who, because of
the high stakes, are likely to expend more time and resources than in ordinary
trials. The number of pretrial motions will be greater and defense counsel
will seek more outside assistance through court appointed experts. Courts
are more likely to grant such requests to avoid being reversed on appeal.' 69
Post-trial appeals will be lengthy and expensive.'
70
B. Suggested Procedural Reforms
Since a person charged with a capital crime receives a different kind of
trial than any other criminal defendant, and one which affords the state a
special advantage in the composition of the jury, there is sufficient reason
to impose procedural restraints upon prosecutors who may be tempted to
exploit the advantage. In information states, the accused should be entitled
to a full adversarial preliminary hearing; the right to counsel; the right to
confront and cross-examine state witnesses; the right to compulsory process;
and the right to require the recording and transcription of the proceedings.
This hearing should focus upon the evidence which the state claims will
support its decision to seek the death penalty and may be limited to an
examination of the existence of a predicate offense and a statutorily pre-
scribed aggravating circumstance. '7'
In indictment states, the accused should have a right to a transcript of
out here and blow holes in a man who is lying dying on the sidewalk.
13 Record of Proceedings at 2257, State v. Resnover and State v. Smith, No. Cr 80-442A
(Marion Super. Ct., Crim. Civ. One) (emphasis supplied). Smith is black. The jurors all were
white as were the prosecutors, defense counsel and the judge. "Super Fly" is an unsavory
character from a film of the late 1960's or early 1970's. The reference to Smith is pejorative
and overtly racial. See generally GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, § 10.2(d). See also
Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
168. See Comment, supra note 29.
169. Id. at 1244-55. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
170. See Comment, supra note 29, at 1262-66.
171. The examination will also give the state and the court an opportunity to consider
whether a death sentence is "proportionate" even though a valid aggravating circumstance may
be present.
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the grand jury proceedings and the power to challenge in court the sufficiency
of the evidence that purports to sustain capital charges . 7 2
Since the issue goes beyond the question of custody pending trial, and
involves the fairness of the trial itself, the standard for determining whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe that a jury will be called upon to
consider a death penalty should be more stringent than the "probable cause
for arrest" standard approved in Gerstein v. Pugh.'73 The appropriate ques-
tion is whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
state, could lead any rational juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the accused is a murderer and that an aggravating circumstance justifying
the death penalty is present in the case. 74 Because at issue is the kind of
trial the accused is to be given, and whether there is a reasonable expectation
that death penalty procedures will be necessary after conviction, only evidence
that would be admissible at trial should be considered by the preliminary
factfinder.175
The state should be free, within the confines of the fair notice require-
ments, to request death penalty charges at a time later than the filing of
the initial indictment or information charging the predicate offense, so long
as the requisite evidentiary showing is made. This will enable the state to
conduct a thorough investigation of the grounds upon which a death penalty
may be warranted. The prosecutor, whose initial request for death charges
may have been rejected for lack of sufficient evidentiary support, should be
free to seek subsequent judicial approval of the capital charges if additional
evidence is discovered.
Similarly, a defendant for whom death penalty charges may have been
approved in an earlier screening procedure should be free to file subsequent
pretrial challenges to the death qualification of the trial jury in light of
changed evidentiary circumstances. For example, the factual support for the
state's death penalty charges may disappear with the granting of the defend-
172. This is contrary to current federal law which does not permit a pretrial challenge to an
indictment "valid on its face." See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Lawn v.
United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350 (1958); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966). Cf. United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Court assumed in all of these cases that any
evidentiary insufficiency would be cured in a subsequent trial or through other pretrial pro-
cedures such as motions to suppress evidence and motions in limine. None of these cases
involved a death penalty charge. Obviously a state's misuse of a death qualified jury by means
of an improperly obtained indictment cannot be cured by a trial before that same jury. It
follows that a defendant must be allowed a means of challenging the evidentiary basis upon
which the state seeks to invoke the extraordinary death penalty procedure. For some additional
suggestions, see Arenella, supra note 50. For a case indicating the need for such a procedure
in an indictment state see Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982).
173. 420 U.S. at 103.
174. The standard is the same as that used to test constitutionally the sufficiency of evidence
supporting a conviction in habeas corpus proceedings. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
For similar suggestions see Arenella, supra note 50, at 476-81, 500-07, 529-34.
175. Arenella, supra note 50, at 531, 562-70.
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ant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence illegally seized or a confession
unlawfully obtained.
Due to the detail and complexity of these suggested procedures, it is
recommended that both indictment and information states enact legislation
designed to monitor the potential of prosecutorial misuse of death qualified
juries in the wake of McCree.'76
CONCLUSION
We are inured to executions. What a few years ago was cause for media-
orchestrated drama and literary exploration is today relegated to the inside
pages and local newscasts. 7 7 Dickens' hangman, if not in constant requisi-
tion, is in frequent demand. With public attention unfocused upon the
charging decisions of prosecutors, the temptation is strong to over-use what
must still be regarded as an extra-ordinary societal response to criminal
homicides.
With the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United States upon a
process that improves the state's chances of obtaining convictions in "high
profile" crimes, the incentive to employ the death penalty process as a
prosecutorial tool has been increased. Neutral screening of a prosecutor's
capital crime charging decisions will not keep deserving cases from the
judgments of death qualified jurors. In most instances the grounds for
seeking the death penalty will be apparent and may be established with no
great difficulty, cost or inconvenience to the state. The crimes are horrible
and the evidence most often is strong. There are some cases, however, of
the kind illustrated in this Article, in which the death penalty processes are
not properly invoked. It is in these few cases, statistically small, perhaps,
but humanly and numerically significant, 78 that prosecutorial zeal must be
tempered by independent judgments upon the facts and the law.
176. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-46a (1985).
177. The subject inspired Truman Capote to create a literary form with In Cold Blood,
followed by Norman Mailer's Executioner's Song. For a lawyer's view see Streib, Executions
Under the Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statutes: The Halting Progression from "Let's Do
It" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point in Pulling So Tight, " 15 RuraERs L.J. 443 (1984).
178. Finch & Ferraro, supra note 17.
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